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Abstract: Redesign of energy system governance processes will become necessary, owing to technological and societal 
change. The emergence of both smart metering systems and smart contract platforms provides opportunities for system 
regulators to re-define roles and responsibilities. In particular, self–enforcing programmatic incentive structures can be 
created and implemented. This paper presents a smart contract oriented general architectural model for public electricity 
networks. It defines the monopoly roles within the system and a framework for instantiation of economic games between 
metered participants. An example incentive system that creates a whole system Schelling point around demand-generation 
balance is presented. A number of potential benefits of the proposed regulatory model and incentive system, over existing 
regulatory structures, are described – they include a lower barrier of entry for balancing participation, improved prediction, 
increased resilience to cascading voltage collapse, and reduced regulatory complexity. 
 
1. Introduction 
Redesign of energy system governance processes will 
become necessary, owing to technological and societal 
change. The factors underlying this change can be categorised 
as digitisation, decentralisation, democratisation and 
decarbonisation [1]. Addressing the resulting regulatory 
challenges in a piecemeal way risks additional cost and 
system insecurity [2]. Hence there is a need for a whole 
system architectural model, spanning physical and 
informational domains, that helps system designers 
conceptualise, and account for, the changes. Sandys et al [3] 
recommend that a renewal of electricity system regulatory 
structure be oriented, firstly, around its users. 
From the perspective of the users of electricity 
networks, five things are paid for: energy (imported or 
exported over a given time window), power (the maximum 
rating of the connection for the given time window), security 
of supply (the continued existence of supply voltage at the 
metered terminals), safety (e.g. sufficient fault level to 
operate protection, but not too much) and self/outward 
signalling of values (e.g. sustainable, expense minimising, 
indifferent) – as personal values are a component of energy 
purchasing decisions [4, 5]. Unless a metered user can source 
all of these things independently, then the existence of an 
external supply, the grid, is required. Two things, within a 
user’s influence, lead to a lower cost external supply; 
certainty of future usage and compromise on service quality 
(e.g. curtailment of power at peak times). Under present 
systems the end-user is not easily able to access cost savings 
from contribution to cost reduction in these categories. This 
leads to the question of how the system might be redefined to 
facilitate no-barrier optional access to these cost-savings – 
one way is through game theory [6, 7]. 
An electricity system can be viewed as a game 
between metered users with rules defining how incentives 
and penalties reach users. The rules require defined roles and 
responsibilities across the system. Technological changes 
bring the possibility of automating many of the rules, and, 
crucially, their enforcement. These changes are typified by 
smart metering and smart contracts. 
Smart contracts represent trustworthy programmable 
money. Using them, value can be automatically transferred 
between parties as a result of some digital event (e.g. a 
reading from a smart meter). They are a tool to instantiate 
rules for economic games. This gives system architects the 
opportunity to design incentive systems that help electricity 
system efficacy and stability. One consideration in this regard 
is the concept of Schelling points. 
Schelling points refer to when consensus of outcome 
is achieved without any direct communication between the 
participating parties. In electricity systems, the desired 
implicit consensus, Schelling point, should be a balanced 
system. To bring this about, two innovations could be 
introduced; a requirement of metered users to predict their 
future usage and the modification of a meter’s rewards in 
relation to the quality of its predictions. However, such a 
system must also address practical requirements for spare 
generation (and potentially load) capacity. 
Helm [8] argues that the provision of spare generation 
capacity is best achieved through transparent auctions with 
discretionary constraints (e.g. volume and price) set by a 
responsible body. Helm shows that this approach has been 
successful in the capacity auctions in Great Britain (GB) and 
recommends that the approach be taken further. Smart 
contracts are means to instantiate transparent auctions. The 
general approach could reasonably be applied to: 
 Energy 
 Balancing commitments 
 Black-start commitments 
 Network operation and maintenance duties 
 System operation duties 
 Auction constraint setting duties  
The question of when such auctions should take place 
follows. In consideration of this, one might define a general 
version of a ‘gate’ in relation to a particular usage period.  In 
present systems ‘gate closure’ is typically the moment at 
which bilateral energy trading stops and system operator 
                     2 
managed short term balancing takes over. More generally, 
however, a ‘gate’ can be considered a formal moment 
occurring before the time of use for a given settlement period. 
If taken this way, a series of ‘gates’ can be thought of as 
extending back in time from the time of use. The first gate 
might represent the capacity auctions, years ahead, and the 
final gate 30 minutes (or perhaps 15 in future) ahead may 
include a balancing commitment auction. Certain gates could 
be selected for auctions related to governance, network 
operation, maintenance, and planning roles. 
The roles and responsibilities related to planning, 
operation and maintenance of public electricity networks 
have been under focus recently, in part due to the increasing 
decentralisation of generation [9]. One proposal, in Great 
Britain (GB), is a transition from Distribution Network 
Operator (DNO) to Distribution System Operator (DSO); 
where distribution operators are given more responsibility for 
the stability of their networks [10–12]. Another proposal, by 
Helm [8], recommends publicly owned separate Regional 
System Operators (RSO) that set auction constraints together 
with separate maintenance and operation roles.  Importantly, 
any new regulatory framework must seek to constrain the risk 
of unforeseen complex control interactions that may result 
from the distribution of stability responsibilities [13]. 
Wright [14] suggests that the DSO might end up as a 
market facilitator with balancing responsibility. Relatedly, 
peer to peer energy trading has received attention [15–17].  
However it is challenging to achieve consistent energy costs 
across a society under peer-to-peer schemes, if the 
negotiations take place in a local context.  It has been argued 
that alternatives, centralised negotiation based schemes, 
would create an infeasible burden on existing dispatch and 
settlement procedures [18, 19]. Limits in the scalability of 
peer-to-peer trading schemes have also been identified [20]. 
Despite this, emerging communication techniques [21] and 
solutions to smart contract platform scaling constraints [22]  
make it likely that this becomes a less significant limitation. 
If the data collection, communications and economic 
enforcement are abstracted away, using the smart metering 
system combined with smart contracts, regulators will be left 
with a choice of rulesets defining the economic game between 
metered participants. 
Sandys et al [3] recommend that a regulatory principle 
of “aggressive transparency” be applied to areas with natural 
monopolies, such as DNOs. Underlying this, however, is a 
challenge to achieve transparent processes without exposing 
private metered usages. The field of cryptography, including 
the topic of zero-knowledge proofs [23] (where possession of 
information can be proven without exposing it), holds 
potential solutions in this area [24, 25]. Furthermore, there is 
potential for privacy preserving schemes to be incorporated 
into smart contract rules [26, 27]. 
Cyber-security in energy systems is critical. Security 
considerations range from the vulnerability of hardware and 
data acquisition systems [28], to vulnerability of those with 
operational responsibility [29], to the vulnerability of the 
game-theoretic rules that describe the whole system [30, 31]. 
When viewed from a regulatory level, two contrasting 
approaches become apparent. The first, following 
Kerckhoff’s principle [32], defined by Shannon as “the 
enemy knows the system” [33], contrasts with a “security 
through obscurity” or “security through complexity” 
approach. The growth of distributed Kerckhoff systems, 
embodied by public permissionless blockchains, e.g. bitcoin 
[34], is well documented [35] – these are typically reliant on 
the safe handling of private keys by system participants. In 
any case, but especially if an electricity system simplifies and 
unifies its rules using smart contracts, the “security through 
obscurity” approach becomes less viable.  
In this paper, a new smart contract oriented whole 
system regulatory model is defined. Following its definition, 
an example incentive system ruleset is described and 
demonstrated with a simple case study. The presented model 
has the following characteristics: 
 Whole system, sequential-timeframe, multi-gate 
transparent negotiations. 
 A system governor role that sets negotiation 
constraints. 
 Network operator roles delineated by voltage level 
and Normally Open Points (NOPs).  
 Metered connections between distinct network 
segments. 
 A requirement that network operators must maintain 
network operation following loss (for a period of 
time set by the system governor) of any combination 
of metered connections. 
 All meters are compelled to submit predictions. 
 All meters have a reputation factor for use in an 
incentive system. 
 The incentive system rewards prediction accuracy 
and timeliness as well as helpful contributions to 
system balancing. 
 Rewards accumulate per network segment in 
relation to prediction quality. 
2. Whole System Regulatory Model 
The proposed regulatory model for public electricity 
networks is divided into 4 layers; physical, data, rules and 
governance. A number of monopoly roles are defined, as 
shown in Table 1. The physical layer consists of the physical 
network connecting metered users as well as the meters 
themselves. The data layer is the securely stored data indexed 
by meter identification numbers. The rules layer consists of 
rules which act on the data layer’s data, including economic 
transactions – it is here that payments made to and from each 
Table 1 Monopoly roles 
Layer Role Description 
   
Governance System 
Governor 
Setting constraints for 
negotiations and roles. 
 Rule 
Maker 
Definition of economic 
rules for negotiation 
and settlement. 
Rules Rule 
Operator 
Instantiation of 
economic rules for 
negotiation and 
settlement. 
Data Data 
Operator 
Storage of and interface 
with meter and 
economic data. 
Physical  Network 
Operator 
Operation of energy 
networks. 
 Meter 
Operator 
Operation of the 
metering system. 
 
                     3 
metered user are calculated and enforced. The governance 
layer is where the roles and rules are defined.  
 
2.1. Governance Layer 
 
The “rule maker” and “system governor” roles are at 
the governance layer. The “system governor” role has 
responsibility for the setting negotiation constraints after 
analysis of the system’s practical need (e.g. spare capacity 
requirements). The “rule maker” role includes the discovery 
and definition of the rules for the system’s economic game. 
This allows for transparent competition in the discovery of 
the rules. One way of achieving this is through algorithm 
discovery competitions, such as the SHA-3 cryptographic 
hashing competition [36].  
 
2.2. Rules Layer 
 
In the rules layer, the rules, and constraining 
parameters, of the system’s economic game are set and 
automatically enforced (i.e. with smart contracts). The rules 
are separated into transparent negotiations (e.g. auctions) and 
settlement stages with respect to a given time of use. The rules 
contain an incentive system for the metered participants. The 
sequence of negotiation and settlement procedures operate 
across sequential time windows with multiple gates. These 
time windows are synchronised with a system pulse, set, for 
example, at 30 minutes. Likewise, the gates are 
conceptualised as existing at every system pulse for a given 
time-window. The gates are used as a reference point for 
negotiations with respect to a time of use. This includes 
negotiations for energy use, balancing commitments and 
monopoly duties. The process of negotiation at gates for 
sequential time windows, followed by settlement, is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Multi-gate negotiation at sequential time-windows 
2.3. Data Layer 
 
The data layer integrates the payment system, the 
metering system (physical layer) and the game-theoretic rules 
(rules layer). The data in the data layer, indexed by meter 
identification number, includes; the meter user’s deposit, the 
actual metered usages for each time window, predictions for 
usage in future time windows and a Prediction Performance 
Factor (PPF) - a reputation value between 0 and 1 for usage 
in incentive schemes within the rules layer.  
 
2.4. Physical Layer 
 
The physical layer is the metering system and the 
physical electricity network. The network operation roles are 
delineated by open points and voltage level in the physical 
network. The interfaces between network operators are 
metered. These meters represent the network operator in the 
data layer and rules layer. A subset of the system’s meters are 
presumed to be capable of frequency response verification, as 
described in prior work [37] – this is to allow participation in 
negotiations for balancing commitments. To address system 
security, a duty to ensure that each network should remain 
operational for a pre-defined period (specified by the system 
governor) upon the loss of any combination of metered 
connections (including those to higher voltage levels) is 
specified. The whole system model and the example incentive 
system ruleset are illustrated in Figure 2. 
3. Example Incentive System Ruleset 
The example ruleset creates a whole system Schelling 
point around system balancing. It does this by rewarding 
deviations from predictions that turn out to be helpful. For 
instance, if the whole system generates less than expected, 
then those meters that generate more than they predicted (or 
have lower demand) will be rewarded in proportion to the 
mis-prediction (with modification by its PPF reputation). 
Conversely, if the meter generates less than predicted, or has 
higher demand, then it must pay a penalty. The meters are 
thus categorised as helpful or unhelpful, for each time 
window. The amount paid by unhelpful meters is set by the 
cost of whole system balancing commitments, for that 
window. As the cost of balancing commitment usage was 
offset by the helpful meters, the rewards of the helpful meters 
are paid by the unhelpful meters. The principle is shown in 
Figure 3. 
Where prediction rewards are unclaimed (due to a PPF 
of <1), the unclaimed amounts accumulate in accounts 
associated with the meter’s network operator area. These 
amounts are public and can be used as an investment signal – 
e.g. a high amount accrued to a particular network operator 
area indicates that the connected meters tend not to predict 
well and that it would therefore be profitable to connect, say, 
a battery with a well predicted output. Conversely, an area 
with little or no accumulated rewards implies that the 
constituent meters are generally good at predicting, therefore 
the value in connection of a well predicted battery is relatively 
lower for that network.  
The meters are categorised either as price takers or 
price makers (synonymous with ‘critical’ and ‘non-critical’  
in previous work [38]). With respect to energy import or 
export in a given future time window, price takers accept the 
price per unit output from a series of transparent negotiation 
procedures participated in by the price makers. The process 
is replicated for balancing commitments. In Figure 2, separate 
sections of the data and rules layers are dedicated to the price 
making meters participating in the negotiations. 
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Fig. 2. Overview of the architectural model
The example ruleset follows the multi-gate 
negotiation, time of use and settlement structure – as 
introduced in Figure 1. At the negotiation gates, price makers 
submit offers and price takers have associated predictions. 
The predictions are processed and a subset of the offers are 
accepted. At the time of use, the meter system records actual 
usage. At settlement, payments are enacted based on actual 
usage. Helpful/unhelpful contributions to system balancing 
are rewarded/penalised, modulated by meter reputation 
(PPF). Meter reputations are updated based on prediction 
accuracy, timeliness and consistency. Unclaimed rewards 
accrue to network areas. Each network operator is assigned 
one or more meter and the meters are arranged in a system 
meter graph describing the meter interconnections. 
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Fig. 3. Principle of the incentive scheme 
 
3.1. System Meter Graph 
 
The network operator licence areas are arranged into 
set of S meter groups,  𝑮 =  {𝑔0, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 … , 𝑔𝑠}  where each 
group is a mutually exclusive subset of the N meters, 𝑴 =
 {𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2 … , 𝑚𝑵 }  ∈  ℤ , in the system. Each network 
operator has at least one meter connected to a higher voltage 
level. Where there is no higher voltage level, a virtual meter 
is added to account for the losses. The meter groups are 
defined as a directed graph (multitree), 𝒟 = (𝑮, 𝒜), where 
𝒜 represents the arcs from meters to groups. An example 
system meter graph is shown in Figure 4 – this relates to the 
network topography shown in Figure 2. A number of 
convenience functions are defined to refer to specific meters 
or groups of meters; these are shown in Figure 4 and defined 
below:  
 
𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐹(𝑚) Function returning the parent group(s) of 
meter m’s group in 𝒟, returns ∅ if the group has no parent 
group, or if the meter has no group (virtual meters). 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑂𝐹(𝑚) Function returning the group of which meter 
m is a member, returns ∅ if the meter has no group (virtual 
meters). 
𝐶𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝐹(𝑚)  Function returning the meters of the 
child group in 𝒟, of meter m. Returns ∅ if the meter has no 
child group. 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑆 =   {𝑚 ∶   𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐹(𝑚) =  ∅  }  The 
set of meters that have no parent groups. 
 
Fig. 4. Example System Meter Graph 
 
 
3.2. Sequential time windows and gates 
 
The framework operates around a set of sequential 
time windows, 𝑻 =  {𝑡0, 𝑡1, 𝑡2 … , 𝑡∞} , and, for each time 
window, a set of L gates extending back in time, 𝑭 =
 {𝑓0, 𝑓1, 𝑓2 … , 𝑓𝐿}.  
 
3.3. Before Time of Use – Energy Price Calculation 
 
Before time of use, the whole system imbalance is 
calculated: 
    
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓
= ∑ 𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑓  (1)
𝑚:𝑚∈𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑆
 
 
where 𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑓  is the predicted usage of meter m for 
time window t at gate f. 
Following this, energy offers are picked until the 
imbalance reaches a threshold, set by the system governor. 
Similarly, balancing commitment offers are selected up to a 
threshold, again set by the system governor. The process is 
repeated across the set of gates 𝑭. Therefore the predicted 
imbalance will tend to reduce as the gates get closer to the 
time of use, as the accepted offers are accounted for. 
Additional offers are accepted based on changes in the 
predictions of price takers or at the discretion of the system 
governor. The algorithms are shown in the appendices. 
At the final gate the energy price,  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑡
, is 
known – it is the mean per unit energy price agreed across 
all of the gates. Similarly, the balancing commitment costs 
are known. 
 
3.4. After Time of Use – Settlement 
 
An overview of the settlement procedure is shown in 
Figure 5, with references to the equations. After the time of 
use, the actual usage of each meter is known and the error in 
prediction can be calculated, for the individual meter: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑚,𝑡                                 (2)
    
 
where 𝑝𝑚,𝑡  is the prediction and 𝑎𝑚,𝑡  is the actual 
usage for meter m at time window t, they are negative for 
generation and positive for demand. 
A function is defined that returns true if an individual 
meter’s prediction error turned out to help correct the whole 
system imbalance in a given time window and false if it 
contributed to the imbalance: 
 
𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐿𝑡(𝑚)
= {
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒,
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑡 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡
> 0
𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                         (3) 
 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡is the total balancing volume used 
in Wh for time window t. For consistency, it is negative for 
generation and positive for demand. 
The prediction performance factor 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑚,𝑡  for each 
meter is calculated using a function that returns a value 
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between 0 and 1. This is used to modify a meter’s reward 
based on its prediction accuracy, consistency, helpfulness of 
errors, and variance across the time frame. It is not explicitly 
defined here, but takes the form shown in Equation (4), 
where 𝑎𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥  are the minimum and maximum 
instantaneous values seen over time window t, 𝓉𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑡 is the 
time before t that the latest prediction was made, 
𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥 are the minimum and maximum of all the 
meter’s predictions made for time window t. 
The PPF is used to produce a reward 
modifier, 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑚,𝑡 , it is only applied if the meter made a 
helpful contribution to system balancing: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑚,𝑡
= {
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑚,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐿𝑡(𝑚) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                     (5) 
 
A meter’s penalty is calculated based on its 
proportional contribution to whole system imbalance, see 
Equation (6), where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is the total cost of 
balancing (for commitments and actual usage) for time 
window t. 
The individual penalties are combined to give the 
total penalties paid within a group, g: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑔,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝑚:𝑚∈𝑔 
                                 (7) 
 
These group penalties are collected and paid to the 
helpful price taker meters within the group. The rewards are 
modified by the PPF, and unclaimed rewards (if PPF is <1) 
accumulate linked to the group’s network area in a variable 
named 𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡- the “Accumulated Unclaimed Reward” for 
group g at time window t. The reward for each meter is 
calculated thus: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑚,𝑡
= (
 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑂𝐹(𝑚),𝑡+ 𝐴𝑈𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑂𝐹(𝑚),𝑡
𝑁𝑔,𝑡
) 
×  𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑚,𝑡                                                                              (8) 
 
where 𝑁𝑔,𝑡 is the number of meters in group g,  and  
𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡  is the Accumulated Unclaimed Reward for the 
meter’s group g at time t calculated at the previous timestep, 
see Equation (9).  
 
𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡
=  𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡−1
− ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑚,𝑡−1                                                         (9)
𝑚∈𝑔
  
 
where 𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡−1 is the Accumulated Unclaimed 
Reward for group g at time window t-1 (previous time 
window). 
The energy payment for each meter is the actual 
energy usage multiplied by the negotiated energy price, 
where the usage of any child groups is subtracted. The 
payment calculation is dependent on whether the meter has 
a child group – meters that do have child groups are network 
operators. This means that network operator meters have to 
pay for the losses on their network, see Equation (10). 
Finally, the total payment from (or to) each meter is 
calculated by: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡
= 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡
− 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑚,𝑡          
                                                                                          (11) 
Where 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 is the governance and 
operation cost of the system attributed evenly to time 
windows and meters,  𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚,𝑡 is the payment (or reward) 
due to any legacy subsidy schemes for a particular meter, 
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚,𝑡 is the cost of balancing commitments and verified 
balancing actions.  
 
Fig. 5. Overview of the settlement ruleset 
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3.5. Case study – settlement incentive scheme 
 
The operation of the example ruleset is demonstrated 
using the simple system shown in Figure 6 and the data in 
Table 2. Figure 6 shows the simple system’s line diagram 
and the associated meter graph. The shading on the line 
diagram indicates the delineation of network operator 
responsibility. The first meter, meter 0, is a virtual meter to 
account for the energy losses of Operator 0. 
 
 
Fig. 6. - Case study example 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows example predicted usages, actual 
usages, balancing commitments, balancing volumes, 
balancing payments, prediction performance factors (PPF) 
and fixed costs for each of the meters. The remaining 
columns show the application of the presented settlement 
ruleset – the associated equation number is shown in brackets 
in the column headers. The initial Accumulated Unclaimed 
Rewards are set to 0. A notional negotiated energy price of 
£10/MWh is used in the calculations. All units are notional 
as the case is illustrative. 
In the example, meters 3 and 4 mis-predict their 
usages and meter 2’s balancing commitment is called upon 
to compensate. Meter 3 mis-predicts in a way that reduces 
the balancing compensation required from meter 2, and so is 
rewarded at the same rate as meter 2. As meter 3’s PPF is 
less than 1, there is an unclaimed reward. Meter 4 mis-
predicts in a way that means meter 2’s balancing 
commitment is needed – therefore it pays a penalty relating 
to the cost of balancing – some of this goes to meter 3, some 
accumulates as unclaimed reward.  Meters 0 and 1 are the 
network operators. The network operator’s pay for their 
losses and for unhelpful mis-predictions, as can be seen by 
the outcome for Operator 1. They are also rewarded for 
helpful mis-predictions. The most profitable network 
operators, therefore, are those that are best able to predict the 
whole system need and adjust their networks to suit, as well 
as minimising losses (assuming no generation excess). 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓(𝑎𝑚,𝑡 , 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 , 𝓉𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑡 , 𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑎𝑚,𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑚,𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑚,𝑡−1)                                                        (4)  
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑡 = {
0, 𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐿𝑡(𝑚) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                 (6)
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡
= {
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡  × 𝑎𝑚,𝑡 , 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝐹(𝑚) = ∅
(1 −
∑ 𝑎𝑐ℎ,𝑡𝑐ℎ∈𝐶𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝐹(𝑚)
∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑢,𝑡𝑐𝑢∈𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐹(𝐶𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝐹(𝑚))
) × 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡  × 𝑎𝑚,𝑡 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (10) 
 
Table 2 Case study example - incentive scheme 
Meter 
Id, m 
User Id. Group, g Balancing 
Commitment 
[MWh] 
Predicted 
usage 
[MWh] 
Actual 
Usage 
[MWh] 
Error 
(2) 
[MWh] 
Balancing  
Volume 
[MWh] 
Balancing  
Payment 
[£] 
 
          
0 Operator 0 ∅ 0 1 1 0 0 2.5  
1 Operator 1 1 0 10 11 1 0 2.5  
2 User 0 1 -4 -11 -12 -1 -1 -10  
3 User 1 2 0 5 4 -1 0 2.5  
4 User 2 2 0 4 6 2 0 2.5  
          
Meter 
Id, m 
PPF ISHELPFUL 
(3) 
Penalty 
(6) 
[£] 
Reward 
(8) 
[£] 
𝐴𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑡+1 
(9) 
[£] 
Energy 
Payment 
(10) [£] 
Fixed 
Costs 
[£] 
Total 
Payment 
(11) [£] 
 
          
0 0.9 False 0 0 0 10 20 32.5  
1 0.8 False 10 0 10 10 20 42.5  
2 0.9 True 0 0  -120 20 -110.0  
3 0.5 True 0 -5.0 15 40 20 57.5  
4 0.5 False 20 0  60 20 102.5  
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4. Implications 
The proposed whole system regulatory model and 
example incentive system ruleset have a number of 
potentially advantageous characteristics, when set against 
traditional approaches: 
Clarity of investment signals for infrastructure 
upgrade and energy storage device connection. This is 
achieved in a number ways: 
 the accumulating unclaimed rewards linked to 
network topology. 
 the increased granularity of network operation 
licences. 
 a prediction performance factor linked to meter 
numbers – this can used by planners, along with 
other data, to analyse where infrastructure 
upgrades will be required in future. 
Participation optionality in system balancing - 
there is no necessary additional attention or activity 
requirement placed on users of the electricity network, but 
those that wish to participate in system balancing have 
negligible barrier to entry, from a regulatory perspective. 
Timely, consistent and accurate prediction 
incentive - the example incentive system for a well-
predicted system permeates through to all participants. This 
is in contrast to present day regulatory frameworks, where 
such signals are only clearly available to a subset of 
participants.  
Transparency in price derivation due to use of 
transparent negotiations with discretionary constraints. 
Systemic cost of intermittency/inflexibility is 
borne by originators Metered users are automatically 
rewarded or penalised according to their contribution to 
system balancing. When applied to intermittent sources, such 
as wind and solar, it ensures that the systemic cost of 
intermittency is borne by its originators. When applied to 
inflexible sources, such as nuclear, it ensures that the 
systemic cost of inflexibility is borne by its originators.  
Optional tax and subsidisation of meter subsets -
the proposed system makes the subsidisation (or penalisation) 
of specific meters, or sets of meters, straight-forward. A 
society may wish to subsidise (or tax) certain subsets of 
metered users, for example: 
 Vulnerable users: E.g. a government could pay 
subsidies directly as deposits for identified 
meters.  
 By voltage level: E.g. The fixed costs portion of 
the total payment could then be modified based 
on the network operation costs for the voltage 
level in question. 
 Accounting for exogenous socialised costs: if 
groups of meters could be identified with 
technology that causes future socialised costs, 
those meters could be taxed (or all of the other 
meters subsidised). 
A market for prediction of whole system need -
Metered users can only achieve consistent rewards if they 
can both modify their usage and predict the whole system 
need. This creates a market for software tools that help 
predict the future state of the system and instruct the user 
devices (e.g. batteries) how to operate.  
 
Increased incentive for Network Operators to 
predict well as the connections from a network operator to a 
higher voltage level are metered, and the meter is assigned 
to the network operator, the network operators have 
incentive to accurately predict the meter’s usage (in addition 
to loss minimisation) and adjust their network to aid system 
balancing.  
Increased security - division of responsibility for 
system stability into smaller network segments, together 
with the new responsibility for each network operator to 
maintain voltage in the event of any meter disconnections 
(including those to higher voltage levels), make the physical 
system more resilient to cascading voltage collapse. 
Improved data for hosting capacity assessment 
and connection offers - As metered users are compelled to 
submit predictions, network operators have improved 
information to forecast the available hosting capacity for 
future connections at each node within their network. This 
can be used to map (and auction) network capacity for new 
connections in a transparent way using an approach from 
prior work [39]. 
Increased competition for the network operation 
role - the increased granularity of network operation licences 
also lowers the barrier of entrance for potential newcomers 
to the network operation marketplace. 
Community energy options - The high granularity 
fragmentation of network operating licence areas gives the 
option of awarding network operator roles to a local 
communities, if all metered users agree (e.g. for a single Low 
Voltage feeder). In this case, the community has 
responsibility for its combined prediction (and therefore its 
reputation and rewards/penalties) in its connection to the 
whole system.  
 Competition amongst rule makers - The creation 
of a separate “rule making” role, which has responsibility for 
defining the rules of the economic game between meters, 
allows for competition in the discovery of rules (e.g. the 
exact rules for balancing commitment auctions). Such 
responsibilities are monopoly duties and can be tendered in 
the same way as network operation duties. A useful approach 
is the use of algorithm discovery competitions, such as the 
SHA-3 cryptographic hashing competition [36], to acquire a 
set of ruleset options. 
Obsolescence of Supplier role In a GB context, the 
supplier role intermediates between demand and generation, 
has responsibility for some of the metering and performs 
customer service roles. Under these proposals, the demand-
generation intermediation is done by the smart contract 
based automatically enforced economic rules. The 
responsibility for the metering is held by “meter operator” 
roles awarded at the governance level. Finally, the customer 
service function could achieved through the creation of one 
or more “system explainer” roles or through competition 
amongst user interface creators. 
 Reduced overall regulatory complexity By 
abstracting the whole system structure into physical, data, 
rules, and governance layers, and requiring both monopoly 
duties and energy flows to be negotiated within a multi-gate 
set of transparent negotiations, much of the system’s 
physical and informational flows can be mapped within a 
single framework. This has the effect of reducing the 
regulatory complexity. 
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5. Conclusion 
A new smart contract oriented whole system 
regulatory model for public electricity networks was 
presented. The model abstracts the system into four layers; 
physical, data, rules and governance. A set of roles was 
defined including “system governor”, “rule maker”, 
“network operator” and “meter operator”. A framework of 
transparent negotiations that take place at multiple gates with 
respect to a usage period, followed by a settlement process, 
was presented.  
Central to the model is the rules layer, where the 
ruleset defining the economic game between the metered 
users is instantiated.  The use of smart contracts means that 
the rules can be automatically enforced and potentially 
lowers the implementation effort required to change them. 
This makes possible a competitive rules discovery process. 
An example settlement ruleset was demonstrated that 
automatically rewards meters for useful contributions to 
system balancing. The rewards are paid for by the meters that 
make unhelpful contributions. A meter’s rewards are 
modulated by its prior prediction based reputation, with 
unclaimed rewards accruing to network areas. This brings 
about a system wide Schelling point around system 
balancing and creates topologically linked incentive signals 
for prospective investors. 
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8.  Appendices  
In this section, two negotiation algorithms are defined 
– for selecting from offers for energy usage and balancing 
commitments. 
 
8.1. Negotiation  of Energy Price 
 
𝒀𝑡,𝑓 = {𝑦𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑦𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑦𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑦𝑡,𝑓,𝐾}         Set of K users 
making conditional energy offers lower than  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓 
𝑽𝑡,𝑓 = (𝑣𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑣𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑣𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑣𝑡,𝑓,𝐾) List of K offered energy 
volumes from 𝒀𝑡,𝑓 users, sorted by associated offer price and 
then, if prices are equal, by volume.  
𝑶𝑡,𝑓 = (𝑜𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑜𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑜𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑜𝑡,𝑓,𝐾) List of K energy price 
offers from  𝒀𝑡,𝑓  users, sorted by offer price and then, if 
prices are equal, by associated volume.  
𝑪𝑡,𝑓 = (𝑐𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑐𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑐𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑐𝑡,𝑓,𝐽)  List of J confirmed 
energy offer volumes for time window t at gate f 
𝚼𝑡,𝑓 = (𝜀𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝜀𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝜀𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝜀𝑡,𝑓,𝐽)          List of J users with 
confirmed energy offers for time window t at gate f 
𝑼𝑡,𝑓 = {𝑢𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑢𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑢𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑢𝑡,𝑓,𝐽}       Set of J accepted 
price offers for confirmed energy offers for time window t at 
gate f 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓 The predicted imbalance of the whole 
system prior to acceptance of offers, see Equation (1). 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑡,𝑓 the discretionary threshold set by the system 
governor for time-window t, gate f. 
 
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for picking energy offers 
Input: 𝑽𝑡,𝑓, 𝒀𝑡,𝑓, 𝑶𝑡,𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓, 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Output: 𝑪𝑡,𝑓, 𝚼𝑡,𝑓, 𝑼𝑡,𝑓 
1: for i = 0 to J do 
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2:   if |𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐∈𝑪𝑡,𝑓 + 𝑣𝑡,𝑓,𝑖|   <
|𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐∈𝑪𝑡,𝑓 | then 
3:       𝑪𝑡,𝑓 =  𝑪𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑣𝑡,𝑓,𝑖  
4:       𝚼𝑡,𝑓 =  𝚼𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑦𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
5:       𝑼𝑡,𝑓 =  𝑼𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑜𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
6:       if |𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑓 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐∈𝑪𝑡,𝑓 |  < 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
then 
7:           return 𝑪𝑡,𝑓, 𝒀𝑡,𝑓, 𝑼𝑡,𝑓 
8:       end if 
9:   end if 
10: end for 
 
8.2. Negotiation  of Balancing commitments 
 
𝑿𝑡,𝑓 = {𝑥𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑥𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑥𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑥𝑡,𝑓,𝑄}   Set of Q users 
making conditional balancing commitment offers at gate 
closure f, for time-window t 
𝑩𝑡,𝑓 = (𝑏𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,𝑄)  List of Q 
offered balancing commitments  from 𝑿𝑡,𝑓 users, sorted by 
associated offer price. 
𝚯𝑡,𝑓 = {𝜃𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝜃𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝜃𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝜃𝑡,𝑓,𝑄}  Set of Q 
balancing commitment price offers from the set of Ut,f users 
List of Q energy price offers from  𝑿𝑡,𝑓 users, sorted by offer 
price. 
𝒁𝑡,𝑓 = {𝑧𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝑧𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝑧𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝑧𝑡,𝑓,𝐽}  Set of J confirmed 
balancing commitment offers for time window t at gate f 
𝛀𝑡,𝑓 = {𝜔𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝜔𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝜔𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝜔𝑡,𝑓,𝐽}        Set of J users with 
confirmed balancing commitment offers for time window t 
at gate f 
𝚽𝑡,𝑓 = {𝜑𝑡,𝑓,0, 𝜑𝑡,𝑓,1, 𝜑𝑡,𝑓,2, … , 𝜑𝑡,𝑓,𝐽}       Set of J accepted 
price offers for confirmed balancing commitment offers for 
time window t at gate f 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡,𝑓 the volume of commitments set by 
the system governor for time-window t, gate f. 
 
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for picking balancing 
commitment offers 
Input: 𝑩𝑡,𝑓, 𝑿𝑡,𝑓, 𝚯𝑡,𝑓, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡,𝑓   
Output: 𝒁𝑡,𝑓, 𝚽𝑡,𝑓, 𝛀𝑡,𝑓 
1:   for i = 0 to J do 
2:       if |∑ 𝑧𝑧∈𝒁𝑡,𝑓 + 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,𝑖|  > |∑ 𝑧𝑧∈𝒁𝑡,𝑓 | then 
3:           if |∑ 𝑧𝑧∈𝒁𝑡,𝑓 + 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,𝑖|> 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡,𝑓then 
4:           𝒁𝑡,𝑓 =  𝒁𝑡,𝑓 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡,𝑓 −
|∑ 𝑧𝑧∈𝒁𝑡,𝑓 | 
5:           𝛀𝑡,𝑓 =  𝛀𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑥𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
6:           𝚽𝑡,𝑓 =  𝚽𝑡,𝑓+ 𝜃𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
7:               return 𝒁𝑡,𝑓, 𝚽𝑡,𝑓, 𝛀𝑡,𝑓 
8:           end if 
9:       𝒁𝑡,𝑓 =  𝒁𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑏𝑡,𝑓,𝑖  
10:     𝛀𝑡,𝑓 =  𝛀𝑡,𝑓+ 𝑥𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
11:     𝚽𝑡,𝑓 =  𝚽𝑡,𝑓+ 𝜃𝑡,𝑓,𝑖 
12:     end if 
13:   end for 
14:return 𝒁𝑡,𝑓, 𝚽𝑡,𝑓, 𝛀𝑡,𝑓 
 
 
 
 
